Epistemic Utility Theory
نویسنده
چکیده
Miners [34, 26]. You are standing in front of two mine shafts (A and B). Flood waters are approaching. You know that ten miners are in one of the shafts, but you don’t know which (e.g., their location was determined by the result of a fair coin toss). You have enough sand bags to block one of the shafts. If the miners are in A, then blocking A saves all 10 miners (and, hence, minimizes disutility, i.e., # of dead miners). If the miners are in B, then blocking B minimizes disutility. If you block neither A nor B, the water will be divided, and only the lowest miner in the shaft will die. Claim. It is rationally permissible to block neither A nor B.
منابع مشابه
Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief
It’s widely accepted that rational belief aims at truth.1 Objectively correct belief is true belief. A more controversial question: how should rational believers pursue the aim of truth? Epistemic utility theorists have argued that the framework of decision theory can explain what it means for rational belief to have the aim of approximating the truth. By combining the tools of decision theory ...
متن کاملJustifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalization: that is, her posterior subjective probability after taking account of evidence X, pnew, is to be set equal to her prior conditional probability pold(·/X). Bayesians can be challenged to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalization is recommended by rationality — whe...
متن کاملUtility proportional beliefs
In game theory, basic solution concepts often conflict with experimental findings or intuitive reasoning. This fact is possibly due to the requirement that zero probability be assigned to irrational choices in these concepts. Here, we introduce the epistemic notion of common belief in utility proportional beliefs which also assigns positive probability to irrational choices, restricted however ...
متن کاملJustifying conditionalisation: conditionalisation maximizes expected epistemic utility
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalisation: that is, her posterior subjective probability after taking account of evidence X, pnew, is to be set equal to her prior conditional probability pold(·|X). Bayesians can be challenged to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalisation is recommended by rationality — whe...
متن کاملCorrelated Nash equilibrium
We modify the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium only to accommodate Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153] maxmin expected utility preferences, and identify the equilibrium concept in n-player strategic games that characterizes the modified epistemic conditions. The epistemic characterization supports the equilibrium concept as a minimal generali...
متن کاملEvaluating Credal Set Theory as a Belief Framework in High-Level Information Fusion for Automated Decision-Making
The goal of high-level information fusion is to provide effective decision-support regarding situations, e.g., relations between events. One of the main ways that has been proposed in order to achieve this is to reduce uncertainty regarding the situation by utilizing multiple sources of information. There exist two types of uncertainty: aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty, also known a...
متن کامل