Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? an Analysis of Free Entry Equilibria
نویسنده
چکیده
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. Although perfect price discrimination ensures efficient output decisions given product characteristics, coordination failures may prevent efficiency in the choice of product characteristics. More fundamentally, even if we have efficient product choices for a fixed number of firms, one always has excessive entry in free entry equilibrium. Our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation including location models as well as representative consumer models of the demand for variety. These results also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entry and imply that one has excessive entry into the ranks of lobbyists. JEL classification codes: L1, L2, D4
منابع مشابه
Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient? an Analysis of Free Entry
We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. With a fixed number of firms, and in the absence of coordination failures, perfect price discrimination provides incentives for firms to choose product characteristics in a socially optimal way. However, with free entry, the number of firms is always excessive. Our results apply to a large class of mo...
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