Competing for Loyalty: the Dynamics of Rallying Support Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. A danger for the agents in this context is that a principal may be able to succeed by exploiting competition among members of the group. Would agents benefit from introducing competition between opposing principals? We show that when principals’ policies provide value to the agents, competition actually reduces agents’ welfare. JEL codes: D70, D72, C78. keywords: contracting externalities, political economy, corporate takeovers, vote buying.
منابع مشابه
Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin allowing a MPE in mixed strategies. When the leader meets follower i in state m, she makes an offer p(m) with probability γm ∈ [0, 1]. The follower accepts the offer with probability αm ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the follower i meeting the leader in state m accepts only if δwout(m−1)+p(m) ≥ δw(m), and accepts with probability one if this inequality holds strictly. No...
متن کاملCompeting for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Political Support∗
We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents’ decisions to support an alternative are irreversible, and agents negotiate and commit their support to the principal sequentially. A danger for the agents in this context is t...
متن کاملPower brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining
We consider a model of decentralized bargaining among three parties. Parties meet one-on-one after being randomly matched, and can sell or buy votes to one another. The party with a majority of the votes can decide to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations to capture additional rents. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which a pa...
متن کاملDemand for Slant : How Abstention Shapes Voters ’ Choice of News Media ∗
Binary decision theory predicts that voters prefer information sources whose biases conform to their own. We argue that voting is not a binary decision problem and that introducing abstention generates “cross-over” in news consumption (i.e., conservative voters consulting liberal media– and vice versa). Specifically, the option to abstain induces voters with considerable leanings towards a part...
متن کاملA Political Economy of the Separation of Electoral Origin
Political constitutions frequently separate the roles of proposer and veto player in policymaking processes. A fundamental distinction lies in whether both offices are subject to direct and separate election, or whether the voter instead may directly elect the holder of only one office. In the latter case, the voter constitutionally forfeits a degree of ex-post electoral control. Why should she...
متن کامل