Side-Payment Contracts in Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Supply Chain Games: Review, Discussion and Applications1
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper investigates supply chain coordination with side-payment contracts. We rst summarize speci c side-payment contracts and present our review on the literature that developed general sidepayment schemes to coordinate supply chains. Following our review, we discuss two criteria that a proper side-payment contract must satisfy, and accordingly introduce a decision-dependent transfer payment function and a constant transfer term. We present the condition that the transfer function must satisfy, and use Nash arbitration scheme and Shapley value to compute the constant transfer term and derive its closed-form solution. Next, we provide a ve-step procedure for the development of side-payment contract, and apply it to four supply chain games: Cournot and Bertrand games, a two-retailer supply chain game with substitutable products and a one-supplier, one-retailer supply chain. More speci cally, for the Cournot game, we construct a linear transfer function and a constant side-payment to coordinate two producers. For the Bertrand game, we build a nonlinear transfer function which is equivalent to a revenue-sharing contract, and show that the constant term is zero and two rms in the game equally share the system-wide pro t. For a supply chain with substitutable products, we present a side-payment contract to coordinate two retailers. For a two-echelon supply chain, we develop a proper side payment scheme that can coordinate the supply chain and also help reduce the impact of forward buying on supply chain performance.
منابع مشابه
Side-payment contracts in two-person nonzero-sum supply chain games: Review, discussion and applications
Article history: Received 17 January 2007 Accepted 19 March 2008 Available online 28 March 2008
متن کاملDistribution Design of Two Rival Decenteralized Supply Chains: a Two-person Nonzero Sum Game Theory Approach
We consider competition between two decentralized supply chains network under demand uncertainty. Each chain consists of one risk-averse manufacturer and a group of risk-averse retailers. These two chains present substitutable products to the geographical dispensed markets. The markets’ demands are contingent upon prices, service levels, and advertising efforts of two supply chains. We formulat...
متن کاملCoordinating a Seller-Buyer Supply Chain with a Proper Allocation of Chain’s Surplus Profit Using a General Side-Payment Contract
In this paper, seller-buyer supply chain coordination with general side-payment contracts is introduced to gain the maximum possible chain profit. In our model, the logistics costs for both buyer and seller are considered and the final demand is also supposed to be a decreasing function of the retail price. Since parties aim to maximize their individual profits, the contractual parameters are s...
متن کاملVehicle Routing Problem in Competitive Environment: Two-Person Nonzero Sum Game Approach
Vehicle routing problem is one of the most important issues in transportation. Among VRP problems, the competitive VRP is more important because there is a tough competition between distributors and retailers. In this study we introduced new method for VRP in competitive environment. In these methods Two-Person Nonzero Sum games are defined to choose equilibrium solution. Therefore, revenue giv...
متن کاملNondominated equilibrium solutions of multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum games in normal and extensive forms
In this paper, we review the development of studies on multiobjective noncooperative games, and particularly we focus on nondominated equilibrium solutions in multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum games in normal and extensive forms. After outlining studies related to multiobjective noncooperative games, we treat multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum games in normal form, and a mathematical pro...
متن کامل