Legislative Representation in Flexible-List Electoral Systems

We develop a theory of legislative representation in open and flexible list proportional rule electoral systems (OFPR). Our framework highlights how representatives’ desire to cultivate a personal vote may undermine or strengthen the pursuit of collective party goals. We show that whether collective and individual goals are in conflict depends on the flexibility of the list—the extent to which preference votes for individual candidates can overturn the ordering in the party list. While a more flexible list always lowers legislative cohesion, we unearth circumstances in which this may weaken a legislator’s incentives to prioritize his constituents’ interest over party interests (“dyadic representation”). We also show that legislative cohesion under flexible list systems may be higher than closed list systems, or lower than single-member plurality contexts, consistent with empirical evidence that has previously defied theoretical explanation. ∗Pablo Montagnes collaborated with us at the inception of this project, and we remain grateful to him. We thank Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, John Huber and Monika Nalepa for helpful comments and suggestions. †Harris Public Policy, University of Chicago, Email: [email protected] ‡Department of Political Science, Columbia University, Email: [email protected]