PIMS / AMI Seminar Friday , July 21 , 2017 3 : 00 p . m . CAB 657 “ Computation of Cournot - Nash equilibrium by entropic regularization ” Luca Nenna
نویسنده
چکیده
In this talk we consider a class of games with continuum of players where equilibrium can be obtained by the minimization of a certain functional related to optimal transport. We then use the powerful entropic regularization technique to approximate the problem and solve it numerically in various cases. We also consider the extension to some models with several populations of players.
منابع مشابه
PIMS / AMI Seminar Tuesday , March 24 , 2015 3 : 00 p . m . CAB 281 “ On a Discrete Selection - Mutation Model : Competitive Exclusion and Uniform Persistence ” Paul
A discrete-time population model in which individuals are distributed over a discrete phenotypic trait-space is studied. It is shown that, for an irreducible mutation matrix , if mutation is small, then an interior equilibrium exists, that is globally asymptotically stable in , while for arbitrary large mutation each trait persists uniformly. For the model reduced to only two traits, conditions...
متن کاملComputation, Multiplicity, and Comparative Statics of Cournot Equilibria in Integers
We give an efficient algorithm for computing a Cournot equilibrium when the producers are confined to integers, the inverse demand function is linear, and costs are quadratic. The method also establishes existence constructively. We use our characterization to discuss the multiplicity of integer Cournot equilibria and their relationship to the real Cournot equilibrium.
متن کاملOn the COalitiOnal Stability Of MOnOpOly pOwer in DifferentiateD bertranD anD COurnOt OligOpOlieS Documents de travail GREDEG GREDEG Working Papers Series
In this article we revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in the presence of a cartel of firms that faces outsiders acting individually. This competition setting enables to deal with both non-cooperative and cooperative oligopoly games. We concentrate on industries consisting of symmetrically differentiated products where firms operate at a constant and identica...
متن کاملCournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences
In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79–94; On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games, J.Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207–223; A unifying pair of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 10...
متن کاملLINDAHL vs . COURNOT NASH : THE ROLE OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION
It is known that a Lindahl equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto-superior to the non-cooperative Cournot-Nash outcome. This paper derives conditions under which the Lindahl Paretodominates the Cournot-Nash solution. We show that all are better off in the Lindahl equilibrium as compared to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when the exogenously given income distribution is not skewed too much or the n...
متن کامل