Learning and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study
نویسندگان
چکیده
This is the rst systematic experimental study of the comparative performance of two incentive compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: the Basic Quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard and the Paired-Di erence mechanism by Walker. Our experiments demonstrate that the performance of the Basic Quadratic mechanism under a high punishment parameter is far better than the same mechanism under a low punishment parameter, which, in turn, is better than the Paired-Di erence mechanism. We estimate three individual behavioral models: an exponentialized Relative-Payo -Sum model outperforms the Generalized Fictitious Play model. We also provide a su cient condition for convergence under the Basic Quadratic mechanism.
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