The Use of Heuristics in Persuasion: Deriving Cues on Source Expertise from Argument Quality

Dual-process models of persuasion contrast the expertise heuristic "experts' statements can be trusted" with systematic processing of message content. Studies in which source expertise and argument quality were simultaneously manipulated revealed that the expertise manipulation affects attitudes when receivers are not highly motivated to scrutinize the provided message. In contrast, when receivers are highly motivated and are able to scrutinize a message their attitude is usually affected by argument quality but is independent of the expertise cue. We argue that this does not rule out that receivers still make use of the expertise heuristic. Rather, they may consider argument quality to infer the expertise of the source. We show that a classic study (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) may be interpreted by this alternative explanation and present a study, in which the effect of argument quality on receivers' attitudes was partially mediated by perceived source expertise. This mediation tended to be stronger among receivers reporting low self-expertise than among receivers reporting high self-expertise. Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 6) (Reimer, Mata, & Stoecklin)