The lamda-nucleolus for non-transferable utility games and Shapley procedure
نویسندگان
چکیده
We rst scrutinize two extensions of the nucleolus for NTU games by Kalai(1975) and Nakayama(1983) ; respectively. We see that some nice things disappear during the process of extension. To de ne the -nucleolus, the -excess function is de ned and is axiomatized. It is nice to see that the -nucleolus satis es the coincidence property and preserves many nice properties of the nucleolus for TU games. Shapley procedure proposed by Shapley(1969) is used to extend Shapley value to NTU games. It is known that the procedure can be applied to a The authors wish to express their gratitude to Mamoru Kaneko for many helpful comments and discussions on both substantive matters and exposition which much improve the paper.
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