A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Note
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements”, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement and presents an alternative proof for a finite player version of their model. JEL Numbers: C70, C72
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