Voting Behavior in Multiple Round Elections: An Analysis of Iran’s 2005 Presidential Election

For the first time after 1979 revolution in Iran, the 2005 presidential election went to the second round. Not only neither candidates could win the majority of the votes in the first round, but the potential voters in the first round were fairly divided between the 7 candidates and abstention. It created a relatively rich menu of options for the voters to choose from, however by using data from election results I show that they voted (or abstained) strategically in the first round. I present a model that justifies the possibility of the change in voting behavior between the first and second round elections in a two stage election game and I analyze the data to explore the possibility of strategic voting based on this change. I present tests to show that the results are still valid in spite of using aggregate data.Moreover the empirical result sheds light on the voting behavior of different factions within the society and their response to different political and ideological agendas.