All-Pay Auctions with Private Values and Resale
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies all-pay auctions with resale opportunities within an independentprivate-value framework. Given the existence of a resale market, the primary players will compete more aggressively over an indivisible prize. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for all-pay auctions with private values and resale and derive a revenueranking result for all-pay auctions with and without resale opportunities. Depending on the first-stage winner’s ability to extract surplus in the resale stage, the initial seller may or may not benefit from excluding some players from the primary competition thus creating a resale market. ∗We are grateful to Masaki Aoyagi, Andreas Blume, Brett Graham and Lin Zhou for helpful comments. †The corresponding author: 535 Fahuazhen Rd. Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China 200052. Email: [email protected]
منابع مشابه
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Für Sozialforschung
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