The Replicator Equation as an Inference Dynamic
نویسنده
چکیده
The replicator equation is interpreted as a continuous inference equation and a formal similarity between the discrete replicator equation and Bayesian inference is described. Further connections between inference and the replicator equation are given including a discussion of information divergences, evolutionary stability, and exponential families as solutions for the replicator dynamic, using Fisher information and information geometry.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/0911.1763 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009