Information aggregation in a large two-stage market game
نویسندگان
چکیده
A market-game mechanism is studied in a two-good, pure-exchange setting with potential information aggregation. The mechanism has two stages. At the first stage, agents make offers, which turn out to be provisional for all but a small and randomly selected group. After first-stage offers are announced, everyone else gets to make new offers at a second stage in which payoffs are determined via a ShapleyShubik market game. When the number of players is finite but large, there exists an essentially unique equilibrium in pure symmetric strategies, an equilibrium that is almost ex post effi cient.
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