A Model for Partial Kantian Cooperation

نویسنده

  • Ioannis Kordonis
چکیده

This work presents a game theoretic model to describe game situations in which there is a partial cooperation among the players. Specifically, we assume that the players partially follow Kant’s “Categorical Imperative”. The model is stated for games with a continuum of players and the basic assumption made is that the participants consider that they belong to virtual groups in which they optimize their actions as if they were bound to follow the same strategy. The relation with the Nash, (Bentham-) Harsanyi, Rawls difference and Roemer solutions is then studied. We derive necessary conditions characterizing the partial Kantian equilibria, using a reduction to a set of optimal control problems. Finally, some examples are given.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1609.01921  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016