Cores of combined games
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C70; C71
منابع مشابه
Cores of Combined
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 145 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010