Objectivity of human consciousness is a product of tool usage

Dijker (2014) has recently proposed a novel approach to consciousness, according to which the primary function of consciousness is producing states of objectivity. States of objectivity are defined (p.2) as “internally represent[ing] objects and their dispositional properties . . . in relatively stable, accurate, increasingly complete, perceiver-independent ways, unbiased by specific needs, motives, and anticipation of instrumental aspects and rewards.” I think that the author has made a very import point, and that the principal objectivity of (some kind of) conscious states is a major issue unfortunately missed in most contemporary theories of consciousness. However, I also think that the publication of Dijker (2014) is only a first step, and that the view of consciousness as the capacity to produce states of objectivity needs further development. I hope that the following comments can contribute to this development. First of all, I would argue that although Dijker’s (2014) approach is original, it has predecessors. Particularly, this was what Franz Brentano (Brentano, 2008; 1st Ed. 1874) meant in his famous definition of consciousness as intentionality: each conscious state, according to Brentano, is “about” some object, which is outside consciousness. This object, therefore, does not belong to consciousness, and in this sense, it is objective. Second, there are cases that quite obviously contradict the above definition of consciousness. Thus, pain experience is self-evidently not objective; therefore, according to the definition, it is not a conscious phenomenon. Such conclusion would have far-going practical consequences. It may imply, for instance, that having sufficiently strong muscle relaxants, surgeons do not need analgesics during their interventions. Whether surgical patients would be enthusiastic about this approach to consciousness, can be questioned. However, this point is much less serious than it appears. The contradicting cases simply indicate that the theory should let down its level of generalization. Possibly, objectivity characterizes not all states of consciousness but only a particular class of such states, e.g., higherorder consciousness of Genaro (1996) and Rosenthal (2004), access consciousness of Block (2005, 2007), secondary consciousness of Edelman (1989), or cognitive consciousness of Panksepp (2005). The merits of Dijker’s proposal will not be diminished by the fact that his ideas are related to an important subtype of conscious phenomena and not to each of them. There is a more serious problem, however. The question remains open where the states of objectivity can come from. If I understand the author correctly, he believes that play behavior can result in conceiving of some aspects of the environment (e.g., children or sexual partner) as “fragile,” vulnerable and carerequesting. This hypothesis, however, does not clarify how the notions of vulnerability and care can help us to explain the phenomenon of objectivity. Relationships with vulnerable entities are emotional through and through. Everybody can only think on one’s own small children, pets or just porcelain vessels. According to author’s definition of states of objectivity, our interaction with these objects should be relatively stable, neutral, perceiverindependent, unbiased by our needs and motives. This is, of course, not the case. Let us approach this issue from a different point. What is objective? Some aspects of Dijker’s (2014) definition, such as accuracy and completeness, are difficult to test. Somebody must have standards of accuracy and completeness to determine in what degree my ideas of the world are accurate and complete. This being can be either God or other humans. In the former case the standards are absolute, but, unfortunately, we cannot know anything about them, because we are lacking divine knowledge. In the latter case we have to admit that also others’ conscious states can be as little objective as ours, because other people have their own biasing factors. Thus, understood objectivity is nothing more than intersubjectivity. This is how the term “objectivity” is defined, e.g., in the test theory: a psychological test is objective if different test administrators and test evaluators come to the same conclusion. However, when Dijker speaks about objectivity and consciousness he obviously means much more than mere agreement between several (perhaps equally subjective) observers. The matter does not get better if we suggest that objective features are such that “really exist” independently of any observer. This definition cannot be operationalized. How can we test that the feature F really exists if, by definition, such testing must not involve any observer? On the other hand, other aspects of the definition can be more useful: independence of the perceiver’s needs, motives and (I would add) his/her particular