On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
نویسنده
چکیده
We study the problem of fairness design. Specifically, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envy-free bundle prices. We present the first polynomial-communication envy-free profit-maximizing combinatorial auctions for general bidders. In this context, envy-free prices can be interpreted as anonymous nondiscriminatory prices. Additionally, we study the canonical makespanminimizing scheduling problem of unrelated machines, in an envy-free manner. For the special case of related machines model we show that tight algorithmic bounds can be achieved.
منابع مشابه
The First Belief Dominance: A New Approach in Evidence Theory for Comparing Basic Belief Assignments
On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations p. 111 On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms p. 120 Stable Rankings in Collective Decision Making with Imprecise Information p. 132 Finding Best k Policies p. 144 Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis New Hybrid Recommender Approaches: An Application to Equity Funds Selection p. 156 A Prescriptive Approach for Eliciting Imprecise Weight Statements in an MCDA P...
متن کاملEnvy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents’ values are drawn independently from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson [1] as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism desi...
متن کاملRevenue Maximization Envy-Free Pricing for Homogeneous Resources
Pricing-based mechanisms have been widely studied and developed for resource allocation in multiagent systems. One of the main goals in such studies is to avoid envy between the agents, i.e., guarantee fair allocation. However, even the simplest combinatorial cases of this problem is not well understood. Here, we try to fill these gaps and design polynomial revenue maximizing pricing mechanisms...
متن کاملEnvy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization
We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. Consistent with standard usage [9] [10], we define an allocation/pricing to be envy free if no agent wishes to replace her allocation (and pricing) with those of another agent. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that find...
متن کاملEnvy-Free Pricing in Multi-unit Markets
We study the envy-free pricing problem in linear multi-unit markets with budgets, where there is a seller who brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. Our goal is to compute an envy-free (item) price and allocation, i.e. an outcome where all the demands of the buyers are met given their budget constraints, which additionally achieves a desirable objective...
متن کامل