Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionary Stable Symbiosis
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چکیده
Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis
منابع مشابه
Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
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