ejap 6:7: Hutto, Nonconceptual content and objectivity
نویسنده
چکیده
Aristotle once developed the difference between man and animal in the following way: animals can understand each other by indicating to each other what excites their desire so they can seek it, and what injures them, so they can flee from it. To men alone is logos given as well, so that they can make manifest to each other what is useful and harmful, and therefore what is right and wrong. A profound thesis. -Gadamer, "Man and Language"
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