A Sartrean account

Consider this very general question: What is the relationship between perception and imagination? When we consider this question, two facts pop out: (i) there is some commonality between the two, but (ii) there is a difference as well. Perception and imagination are alike in some respect(s), but also differ in some. The question is how to characterize the similarity and how to characterize the difference. Thus we may replace our single question with a pair: (Q1) What is the similarity between perception and imagination? (Q2) What is the dissimilarity between them? These questions are still ambiguous, however, insofar as the terms “perception” and “imagination” are. The two nouns are most commonly used to denote putative faculties or capacities. These can be characterized in terms of the mental states they produce, or have the function of producing. Perception is the “faculty” that produces, or has the function of producing, perceptual states. Imagination is the faculty that produces, or has the function of producing, imaginative states. Thus Q1 and Q2 are best understood as ultimately about states (rather than faculties). Imaginative states come in a several varieties.1 One distinction is between imagining an object and imagining awareness of the object: I can imagine a dog or imagine seeing a dog.2 Another distinction is between propositional and “objectual” imagining: I can imagine that Lena Dunham is elected president or I can imagine a purple dog. It is sometimes claimed that the relationship between objectual and propositional imagining is analogous to that between perceiving and believing (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; McGinn 2004). But this is misleading. It is true that both the following are admissible reports of imaginative states: