Ongoing quest for QWERTY∗

First, we replicate the remarkable result of Hossain & Morgan (AER 2009), in which subjects in an experimental market tip almost perfectly to the superior platform even if an inferior platform enjoys initial monopoly. Next, we show that this result disappear when seemingly innocent increases in out-of-equilibrium payoffs are introduced. The inflated payoffs do not alter payoffor risk-dominance relations, and does not impact on players’security levels. We conclude that the need for a theory of equilibrium selection cannot be bypassed by appealing to the realities of the (experimental) market place. ∗Tanjim Hossain generously shared his program files and instructions with us, making a close replication possible. The research is financed by a grant from the Norwegian Research Council. †Department of Economics, BI Norwegian Business School, [email protected] (corresponding author) ‡Department of Economics, BI Norwegian Business School, [email protected]