A Note on the Weak Sequential Core of Dynamic TU Games

نویسندگان

  • Helga Habis
  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings
چکیده

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • IGTR

دوره 12  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010