Limitations of acellular pertussis vaccines

Although humans are typically willing to punish so-called free riders—people who use public resources without contributing to them—most people balk at sanctioning community members who refuse to punish others. Modern societies usually address this threat to collective action by installing central authorities such as police and judicial systems that punish both free riders and individuals who refuse to punish, such as tax evaders, whose actions undermine the central authority. Christian Hilbe et al. (pp. 752–756) present a mathematical model that addresses a seeming paradox in this real-world paradigm: How do individuals who refuse to sanction offenses like tax evasion, known as second-order punishment, strive for an authority that does? According to the authors, when test participants were allowed to choose institutions by migrating between communities with and without second-order punishment, they exhibited bias for institutions that do not punish tax evaders. However, when participants were required to vote for institutions and accept the decision of the majority, they preferred a society with institutionalized second-order punishment. The findings suggest that democracy prompts individuals to consider the broad community and make institutional choices that enhance the welfare of all, according to the authors. — T.J.