The Economics of International Agreements and Dispute Settlement with IPRs
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Reply
This paper analyzes GATI' and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as OAT!', may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from 'international obligation," a ...
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