Partially Strategyproof Mechanisms for the Assignment Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
• Prop. 8. If g imperfectly dominates f, then hβ(f,g) imperfectly dominates f. ... and yield a hierarchy of manipulability and efficiency. • Prop. 9./10. Given f SP, g manipulable and weakly less varying than f, g imperfectly dominates f, 0≤β<β‘≤1, then 1. hβ‘(f,g) is intensely and strongly more manipulable than hβ(f,g) 2. hβ‘(f,g) imperfectly dominates hβ(f,g). ... which preserve PSP, are computable, ... Introduce hybrid mechanisms, ... • Prop. 1. Hybrid mechanisms hβ(f,g)=(1-β)f+βg are well-defined. • Thm. 1./Cor. 1. Given f SP and g weakly less varying than f, we have hβ(f,g) is PSP on URB(r,B,m). 6(r,B) 7b > 0:
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1303.2558 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013