Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A Rationale for Consistency
نویسندگان
چکیده
Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate the rival’s behavior correctly. (JEL: D 43)
منابع مشابه
Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability: A new rationale for consistency∗
Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations Þrms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, Þrms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines Þtness in the evolutionary game. We show that the unique conjectures which are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate rivals behavior correctly.
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