Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
نویسنده
چکیده
The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 41 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002