nterfaces of social psychology with situated and embodied cognition

The recent rise of interest in situated and embodied cognition has a strong interdisciplinary flavor, with contributions from robotics, cognitive anthropology, cognitive psychology, and developmental psychology, among other disciplines. However, social psychology has been almost completely unrepresented. Social psychologists investigate the ways people perceive, interact with, and influence each other, and this field therefore offers an ideal standpoint for the investigation of many of the most central aspects and themes of the situated cognition approach—because the relevant ‘situation’ in which cognition takes place is, almost always, a social situation defined by an individual’s group memberships, personal relationships, and social and communicative goals. This paper briefly reviews social psychological research and theory related to five major themes of situated and embodied cognition. The themes are: cognition is for action; cognition is situated (radically affected by situations, and makes use of situations as resources); artifacts and situations effectively extend cognitive processes out beyond the individual; cognition is embodied; and situated cognition affects and interacts with symbolically based thought.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. The recent rise of interest in situated and emvestigate the ways people perceive, interact with, and bodied cognition has—as one of its most salient and influence each other, studying specific topics such as attractive features—a strong interdisciplinary flavor. person perception, group prejudice and stereotyping, Contributors have come from backgrounds as diverse personal relationships, group processes, persuasion, as robotics (Brooks, 1999), cognitive anthropology and social influence. A recent and authoritative (Hutchins, 1995), cognitive psychology (Barsalou, overview of the field is provided by Gilbert, Fiske 1999), and developmental psychology (Thelen & and Lindzey (1998). Social psychologists generally Smith, 1994). However, a major subdiscipline of work with laboratory experimental methods and psychology has been almost completely unrepretheoretical constructs with close parallels to those in sented: social psychology. Social psychologists incognitive psychology. Although a few isolated voices have been heard within social psychology advocating the study of the situated nature of cognition *Corresponding author. (e.g., Schwarz, 2000; Smith & Semin, 2001), for the E-mail addresses: [email protected] (G.R. Semin), [email protected] (E.R. Smith). most part this represents a novel viewpoint in the 1389-0417/02/$ – see front matter  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PI I : S1389-0417( 02 )00049-9 386 G.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 context of a field that still largely accepts traditional ships). Situated cognition holds that artifacts and notions of internal representation and computation. situations participate in ‘cognition’, effectively exDespite the minimal interaction between social tending cognitive processes out beyond the indipsychology and situated cognition to date, our mesvidual; similarly, social psychological research has sage in this paper is that the fields actually have a emphasized how dyads and social groups extend the great deal in common. In fact, we believe that social cognitive powers of the individual. The theme of psychology offers an ideal standpoint for the inembodiment is also important to the situated cognivestigation of many of the most central aspects and tion movement; similarly, social psychology has themes of the situated cognition approach—because documented how social thoughts and judgments are the relevant ‘situation’ in which cognition takes affected by bodily states, motivations, and actions. place is, almost always, a social situation defined by Finally, the relations between situated cognition and an individual’s group memberships, personal relasymbolically based thought have been an important tionships, and social and communicative goals. topic; social psychological research has addressed In this paper, we briefly review social psychologithis issue from the viewpoint of ‘dual-process’ cal research and theory related to several major theories. themes of situated and embodied cognition. Our reviews will be illustrative rather than comprehensive, since our purpose is to demonstrate the richness 1 . Cognition is for action of relevant work in social psychology to people interested in situated and embodied cognition who The first, and perhaps most central theme of may not be aware of the contributions (current and situated cognition is that cognition is for action; potential) of our field. For the same reason, we will intelligence is shown not in detached thought but in give an overview of research contributions by many adaptive behavior. Social psychology has often recdifferent groups rather than focusing specifically on ognized this, and has developed a conceptual underwork in which we personally have been involved. standing of attitudes, person impressions, This paper is not intended to survey all work on stereotypes, and other types of action-oriented represituated and embodied cognition, nor to summarize sentations. The insight that cognition is for action the major and ongoing contributions of disciplines dates back to William James (1890) and has been other than social psychology. In limiting this paper’s quite prominent in recent years within social psygoal to the presentation of relevant work from social chology (Fiske, 1992). Specifically, social psychopsychology, we have no intention of de-emphasizing logical theory recognizes that social perception and the importance of other, complementary conceptual judgment are embedded in a practical context of and methodological approaches, only of arguing that interaction, the perceiver’s motives, and so on. social psychology should become a part of the Implications of this point are many. For one thing, interdisciplinary mix around these issues. the accuracy of social judgments (for example, The five themes we will address include major judgments about another’s personality) is not absotenets of situated and embodied cognition. One lute, but is usually found to be ‘good enough’ (Fiske, theme is that cognition is for action; under this 1992; Kenny & Albright, 1987) for practical purheading we review social psychological research that poses. Even well-documented biases in social pershows how cognitive processes and representations ception, which have occasionally led to caricatures are effectively shaped by social goals and the of social perceivers as almost doltish (e.g., Nisbett & requirements of action. Another theme is that cogniRoss, 1980), can reasonably be viewed as socially tion is situated (is radically affected by situations, functional. For example, the overweighting of negaand makes use of situations as resources); social tive information relative to positive information in psychological work has examined many ways in person perception has pragmatic utility (Skowronski which, rather than being invariant and self-directed, & Carlston, 1989; Peeters, 1991). psychological processes are specific to particular Another aspect of the pragmatic nature of social social situations and contexts (such as social relationperception is that traits, stereotypes, and the other G.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 387 constituents of impressions are used precisely beshowing that attitudes can be automatically acticause they have implications for action. Traits and vated—without the person’s intent or even awareother personality constructs (such as hostile, smart, ness—to color perceptions and influence judgments or honest) serve as summaries of people’s social and behaviors toward the objects (Fazio, Sanbongoals, abilities, or typical behaviors, that are immatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986). Attitudes are a portant to us as we interact with those people preeminent example of action-oriented representa(Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989; Mischel & Shoda, tions, because they specify not just the nature of the 1998). Similarly, social categories such as gender, object but how to behave toward it (e.g., whether to age, and ethnicity are important in person perception approach or avoid it). because they are cues to many important social roles Person impressions as well as attitudes are actionand behaviors (Eagly, 1987). oriented representations. First, as already noted, Finally, social psychologists have focused much traits, social categories, stereotypes, and other comresearch attention on the ways perceivers’ social ponents of person impressions are important because goals and motives, along with other pragmatic they are useful guides to appropriate social action. concerns, pervasively influence social perception. We avoid others that we perceive as ‘hostile’, ask for For example, in perceiving others our goals are not advice from people who are categorized as ‘smart’, always to form the most accurate impressions, but and so on. In addition, according to Carlston’s often to form impressions that will let social inter(1994) Associated Systems Theory (AST), social action proceed smoothly and predictably (Snyder, behaviors are directly represented as part of our 1993). At other times, accuracy goals become less mental representations of other people. These repreimportant than pragmatic concerns related to prosentations include several different types of inforcessing efficiency, so we dispense with careful mation that reflect contributions from four underlythought and arrive at conclusions based on quicking representational systems: visual, verbal, affecand-dirty heuristic methods that can lead to ‘good tive, and action. For example, an impression may enough’ judgments with high efficiency (Gilbert, include images of the person’s appearance (visual 1991; Chaiken & Trope, 1999). system), emotions felt toward the person (affective system), and traits believed to characterize the person 1 .1. Mental representations are for action (verbal system). Importantly, the impression also includes representations of the perceiver’s own beA related theme is that mental representations are haviors toward the person (action system), such as also tuned and oriented toward adaptive action. giving the person hugs or teasing him. Evidence of Social psychologists have extensively studied one several types (reviewed in Carlston, 1994) supports class of action-oriented representations: attitudes. the general postulates of the AST model as well as Attitudes, or evaluations of persons, objects, or ideas, the specific proposition that impressions contain have been considered perhaps the most characteristibehavioral components. Thus, impressions are accally social psychological concept (Allport, 1954). A tion-oriented representations. person’s dislike for spinach, or affection for her Impressions of others are also regulated by the children, or distrust of tax-cut proposals, has implicarelationships we have with them and the ways we act tions for her judgments and actions in the social toward them. Research supporting this point (e.g., world. These evaluations become part of the perceivBaldwin, 1992; Holmes, 2000; Fiske, Haslam & er’s mental representations of the attitude objects, Fiske, 1991) suggests that relational interdependence along with other, more objective features. Thus, and its action implications are integral to the way we attitudes represent relationships between the agent represent people. For example, other people with and the attitude object, which have implications for whom one has the same type of relationship (as the way the agent perceives the object and acts categorized by Fiske’s model, (Fiske, 1991)) tend to toward it, as well as for the way the person thinks be confused with each other. This pattern of confuabout it and mentally represents it. The power and sions holds independent of the targets’ personal functional value of attitudes is attested by research characteristics, such as age, race, or personality traits 388 G.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 (Fiske & Haslam, 1996). These findings suggest that subtlest of situational cues can influence these suppeople mentally represent others in terms of the posedly fundamental and automatic cognitive protypes of relationships that they have with those cesses (Norenzayan & Schwarz, 1999). The repeople, and therefore the types of actions that they searchers asked experimental participants to read a perform toward each other, such as communal newspaper report on a mass murder. The participants sharing, market-oriented bargaining, etc. then had to give their causal explanations for the event on a questionnaire. For some participants, the first page of the research questionnaire had a letter2 . Socially situated nature of cognition head reading ‘Institute for Social Research’ while for others it read ‘Institute of Personality Research’. One of the enduring slogans of social psychology This subtle change influenced participant’s causal is the ‘power of the situation’ over human behavior. explanations: they used more situational explanations Social psychologists studying relationships, groups, and fewer dispositional ones in the former case, and other aspects of larger social contexts are in an whereas the ‘Personality’ context resulted in more ideal position to diagnose the exact aspects of social dispositional causes. Thus the ‘fundamental attribusituations that are significant for adaptive behavior. tion error’, the tendency to overemphasize disposiThe notion of the ‘power of the situation’ captures, tional explanations for behavior, is not solely due to for example, our field’s findings that social behaviors automatic and invariant inner cognitive processes, such as helping (Latane & Darley, 1968) and such as the greater salience of actors than of their harming others (Milgram, 1974) are not driven by surroundings. Instead, attributions are highly sensithe individual’s internal dispositions and desires so tive to participants’ perceptions of what is epistemimuch as by detailed aspects of the social situation. cally relevant to their communicative partners (in More broadly, this notion stands in opposition to the this case, the researchers). assumption that automatic, inner cognitive /computaDiverse lines of research have provided generally tion processes operate in rather invariant fashion, similar findings, supporting the argument that social without much regard to the details of the immediate contexts fundamentally condition cognitive prosocial situation. Of course, an analytic and empirical cesses. Seemingly automatic cognitive processes and focus on the causal flow from the social environment outcomes that actually turn out to be deeply affected to aspects of cognitive process and social behavior is by social contexts include self-esteem (e.g., Crocker, not inconsistent with the idea that behavior itself in 1999), the self-concept (McGuire & McGuire, 1988; turn constrains and constructs ongoing interaction Tice, 1992), and social stereotypes (e.g., Schaller & and therefore the emergence of future situations. Convey III, 1999). Numerous studies conducted One striking example of the power of social within a communication framework show that the situations over cognition can be found in recent characteristics of the recipient of a message sysresearch on the ‘fundamental attribution error’. This tematically influence the attitudes, beliefs and knowlis a label for the finding that people generally edge of a speaker who formulates a message (Krauss attribute behaviors to the inner characteristics or & Fussell, 1996; Semin, 2000). Even the operation dispositions of the person who performed the beof memory (seemingly the most internal of cognitive havior, rather than seeking the causes of behavior in processes) is found to be flexible and responsive to the social situation (Ross, 1989; Gilbert, 1991). This the emergent qualities of different social situations error has in the past been explained as due to (e.g., Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980). All of these studies properties of automatic, invariant cognitive proshow that situations and particularly social contexts, cesses, such as the idea that ‘behavior engulfs the including the relationship of the individual to partfield’ or that the salience of an actor’s movement ners, communicators, audiences, or fellow group against a relatively static situational background members, are among the most important regulators makes the actor automatically attract attention and of cognition. Of course, the recent explosion of hence inferred causal power (Heider, 1958). Recent research on cultural psychology (including, notably, research, however, decisively reveals that even the findings on the culture-specificity of the ‘fundamenG.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 389 tal attribution error’) also offers strong support for have made this argument, demonstrating that people the same conclusion (Markus, Kitayama & Heiman, mistakenly infer that they willed specific behaviors 1996). under certain conditions—such as when the thought of the behavior enters conscious awareness a short 2 .1. The illusion of inner causes of behavior time before the behavior is actually performed. In related research, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) and As we just discussed, many aspects of behavior others have demonstrated that social behaviors can are actually structured by situations. At the same be triggered by subtle environmental stimuli—such time, research on the fundamental attribution error as subtle presentations of words related to the has documented that observers generally explain behavior. For example, presentation of words like behaviors by pointing to the actor’s inner beliefs, ‘polite’ in a seemingly unrelated context causes goals, or personality traits (Ross, 1989). In fact, research participants to wait markedly longer before people do this when explaining not only other interrupting someone who goes on talking and people’s behaviors but also their own. We must do talking at great length. In such cases, stimuli in the this because we lack direct introspective access to environment (the experimentally presented words) the mechanisms directing our behavior (Bem, 1967). actually cause the behavior, but the stage is set for As sense-making and narrative-constructing creaself-inference processes to operate and lead the tures, we construct rationales and explanations for person to conclude that he or she willed the bemany things that we observe—especially those, like havior. our own behaviors, that are inescapably important to us. These explanations are based on a variety of observable cues, such as our inner thoughts and 3 . Groups extend the cognitive powers of the feelings and other people’s reactions to us (Baumeisindividual ter, 1998). Because our self-attributions are inferences from such cues (rather than being self-knowlOne of the most conceptually significant claims of edge arising from direct introspection) they are situated cognition is the idea that people rely on the extremely sensitive and responsive to immediate environment to facilitate and structure cognition in social situations. For example, if people are infact, we often directly manage the environment to structed to present themselves in a particular way aid cognitive tasks. Examples include putting an (e.g., as extraverted or introverted) to an audience, empty milk bottle by the door so that we remember their appraisals of their actual degree of extraversion to get milk the next time we go out, or putting or introversion change accordingly (Rhodewalt & materials related to a current task on top of other Agustsdottir, 1986). materials on a desk, to focus our thinking on one If our subjectively perceived inner characteristics task and avoid distraction from unrelated matters (such as goals or desires) are often constructed online (Kirsh, 1995; Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). Thus the as post-hoc rationalizations for our actions, intriguphysical environment can actively participate in ing questions must be raised about our beliefs that cognitive processes, by cueing, aiding, prioritizing, our inner mental representations and characterisor otherwise structuring the processes. Social psytics—beliefs, goals, personality traits, values, and so chology contributes research evidence on how social on—actually direct and control our actions. Suppose groups can do the same things: participate in the that a person performs an action, then through selfconstruction of mental representations and the properception processes infers corresponding inner cessing of information, in ways that go beyond what characteristics such as traits, goals, or attitudes. In an isolated individual could do. Social psychologists this case, the match between the inferred internal have investigated this theme under a number of states and the overt behavior, which naturally seems related terms including shared reality (Hardin & like the strongest evidence that the behavior was Higgins, 1996), socially shared cognition (Resnick, generated by those states, actually may not demand Levine & Teasley, 1991; Levine, Resnick & Higgins, that conclusion at all. Wegner and Wheatley (1999) 1993), and group cognition (Tindale & Kameda, 390 G.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 2000; Kerr, Niedermeier & Kaplan, 2000; Gigone & task. Exemplifying this point, researchers have foHastie, 1997; see review by Thompson & Fine, cused on specific types of tasks (e.g., navigation) that 1999). require the coordination and synchronization of One of the tenets driving social psychology from knowledge that is divided among a number of its beginnings is the assumption that the central specialists. The socially organized coordination of function of human interaction is the production of a knowledge, which is public and accessible in comsocially shared reality (Asch, 1952; Festinger, 1950; munication, is a product that has different properties Heider, 1958; Sherif, 1936). One of the earliest than individuals (e.g., Hutchins, 1995). classics in experimental social psychology investiTransactive memory systems, in which memory is gated how socially shared knowledge structures socially shared and indexed (Wegner, 1995), are emerge and are maintained. Sherif (1936) used the another example of socially distributed processing. autokinetic effect, the fact that people put in a dark Research shows how communication processes and room perceive a stationary light spot as moving, to the knowledge that other people have stored knowlillustrate the emergence of socially shared knowledge can serve as resources to complement indiedge structures. When a group of participants are put vidual memory. The successful retrieval of an inin a completely darkened room and asked to describe dividual item from memory can be regarded as the light moments aloud, then their respective illusrelying on other persons—as an external scaffold or ory perceptions of movement quickly converge. external storage. Indeed, recent research has shown Moreover, once a group frame of reference is that group memory is often superior to individual established regarding the illusory movement then this memory (e.g., Clark & Stephenson, 1989; Hinsz, ‘norm’ is maintained even when members of such a 1990). In all these cases, we can meaningfully speak group join other groups with movement ‘norms’ that of cognition as distributed, occurring not only within are different from the one in the individual’s original an individual mind but extended across other people group. or elements of the environment. Put another way, the The common denominator of a number of research cognitive powers of the mind are enhanced by social traditions that emerged in the 1950s is the imporor environmental supports or scaffolds. tance of understanding how social reality is created, validated and maintained by means of comparison and communication processes between individuals 4 . Cognition is embodied and in groups. Moreover, the notion that cognition is shared and not limited to the individual, that comUntil the last decade or two, psychologists considmunication processes allow shared representations to ered motivation and cognition to be entirely separate, be constructed and cognitive effort to be distributed even opposing systems. Motivation was analyzed among individuals, has attracted much attention in using theoretical terms (e.g., psychodynamic models) social psychology (Zajonc & Adelmann, 1987). completely distinct from those used to understand Another line of research has addressed the distribcognition (e.g., computational models). More recentuted nature of cognition and how communication ly, however, theorists have recognized the imporitself has to be treated as cognition at the service of tance of the constraint of embodiment. Nervous providing ongoing solutions to tasks that exceed the systems have evolved for the control of bodies, capacities of any one individual. Caporeal (1997), because organisms must adapt their behavior to meet working from an evolutionary perspective, believes bodily requirements in a rapidly changing environthat the demands of human survival led to the ment. With this recognition, psychological theory and emergence of psychological tendencies adapted speresearch has increasingly focused on the interdepencifically to group life. Among these tendencies is the dence between cognition and motivation, affect, and ability to distribute cognition within small (size action. Thus, cognition is now broadly understood as around five) groups as they jointly focus attention on part of an overall functional and motivational sysand communicate about aspects of an immediate tem. G.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 391 Although human motivation is certainly not narof the upper arm (pushing) can have an impact on rowly limited to the basic matters of seeking nutrievaluative processes, whereby arm flexion towards tion and avoiding predators, a number of theoretical the body is broadly interpreted as approach and away approaches to ‘self-regulation’ make converging from the body as avoidance. Thus, the type of arm assumptions that fundamental motivational systems movement people make during the presentation of organized around approach and avoidance still unChinese ideograms has been shown to influence their derlie human self-regulation (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner subsequent evaluation of those figures (Cacioppo, & Berntson, 1999; Higgins, 1997). For instance, Priester & Berntson, 1993). By the same token, research on the function of affect and attitudes as horizontal or vertical head movements (nodding or preparatory for action has systematically examined shaking) influence evaluations (Wells & Petty, the interface between approach and avoidance moti1980). Moreover, motor movements such as moving vation, affect, and primitive approach and avoidance the head vertically or horizontally have also been behaviors (motor programs). Research shows that shown to enhance recognition memory for positive information linked to positive affect induces an and negative words, respectively (Foerster & Strack, approach motivation and increases the tendency to 1996) and thus show the influence of bodily action engage in approach related behaviors. In contrast, the on memory performance. More recently, Neumann processing of negative affective information activates and Strack (2000b) have demonstrated that participavoidance motivation and an increase in the likeliants were faster in classifying positive affective hood of withdrawing from an object. A substantial words than negative ones when pressing their palm amount of the research work has shown that such upwards against the underside of a table (approach affective-motor program links are immediate and movement). In contrast, when they were pressing automatic, ‘impulsive’ and not ‘deliberate’ (e.g., their palm down on the top of the table (activating Neumann & Strack, 2000a,b) since the organism the avoidance system), they were faster in classifying needs to select appropriate responses in an environnegative words than positive words. Moreover, the ment that changes rapidly. Although the terminology researchers found that the perception of movement of embodiment and embodied cognition has to our towards or away from a person has a similar effect, knowledge not been used in social psychological facilitating how positive and negative affective inwork there is a substantial body of research that falls formation is processed. directly into this domain. A corollary of the embodiment of cognition is the Another dimension of embodiment is the fact that ideomotor link. Interest in the ‘ideomotor’ or percepmotor plans (facial expressions and postures) intion-behavior link has a long history in psychology, fluence subjective feelings (cf. Adelman & Zajonc, dating back to William James (1890). For example, 1989) including evaluative or non-evaluative judgresearchers have demonstrated that witnessing agments. For instance, facial expressions influence gressive behavior (e.g., in the media) can increase the judgments of how funny a cartoon is (Strack, Martin likelihood of actual aggressive behaviors (Berkowitz, & Stepper, 1988). Holding a pen with your teeth 1984). More recently, researchers have demonstrated creates a facial expression similar to smiling, wherethe same principle with regard to other types of as holding a pen loosely between pursed lips resemsocial behavior. Perceiving another person performbles frowning. Researchers find that these manipulaing a behavior or having the concept of a behavior tions influence people’s judgments of the funniness activated through priming methods leads to the of cartoons—importantly, without the research paractual performance of the behavior (Chartrand & ticipants’ being aware of the links of the facial Bargh, 1999; Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996). In expressions to emotions. Similarly, non-affective other words, representations of behaviors are actionfeelings can also be influenced by expressions. The oriented in the sense that activating those representafurrowing of a brow is likely to induce the feeling of tions—even in the course of perceiving another mental effort (e.g., Larsen, Kasimatis & Frey, 1992). person or for similar extraneous reasons—tends to Similarly, isometric flexion (pulling) and extension lead to the production of the behavior (Prinz, 1990). 392 G.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 We use our bodies in the process of perceiving example is an optical illusion, where one can simulbehaviors. taneously ‘know’ that two lines are the same length yet ‘see’ that one line is obviously longer than the other. Another example is problems illustrating the 5 . Situated cognition and symbolic thought: so-called conjunction fallacy, such as the ‘Linda’ dual-process models problem. ‘Linda’ is described to participants in a way that makes her seem liberal and socially In humans, situated cognition (based on implicit, concerned, and they are then asked whether it is action-oriented representations) coexists with a more more likely that (a) Linda is a bank teller or (b) explicit, symbolic style of processing. Social psychoLinda is a bank teller and a feminist. Many participlogists have studied these two systems under the ants give the logically incorrect (b) response. Sloman banner of ‘dual process models’ contrasting heuristic (1996) argues that this response reflects the operaand automatic versus systematic and more thoughtful tion of a more automatic, heuristic processing system processing (see Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Chaiken & that relies on the association between Linda’s attriTrope, 1999). These models hold that much of our butes and being a feminist. Most participants also, thought and action, especially in routine, everyday however, can recognize the logical necessity that situations, is generated by implicit and relatively response (a) must be correct because (a) includes (b) automatic processes (Wegner & Bargh, 1998) that as a subset. are strikingly akin to those of the other higher Other compelling evidence for dual processing mammals and especially primates. On the other systems comes from studies of arithmetic skills. hand, especially in situations involving uncertainty, Dehaene (1997) and Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, motivational conflict, or multiple difficult-to-disStanescu and Tsivkin (1999) summarize evidence criminate alternatives for action, people can draw on from laboratory studies in adults, infants, and ania more symbolically based style of thought in which mals, as well as lesion and brain-imaging studies that they devote conscious and effortful consideration to demonstrate two separate systems underlying our their plans and actions. In this mode, we use numerical abilities. One system deals with approxilanguage and symbolic structures effectively as tools. mations and with relative quantities as well as with a Support for this notion of dual types of processing few absolute numbers (1, 2, 3). This system is shared comes from an incredibly wide range of studies in with infants and nonhumans, and is spared in pamany topical domains within social and cognitive tients with language impairments. Imaging studies psychology. As summarized by Smith and DeCoster suggest that this system is mediated by brain regions (2000), people can use these two basic types of also implicated in visuo-spatial tasks. Another sysprocessing in such areas as problem solving tem deals with exact arithmetic relations, is absent in (Sloman, 1996), analyzing persuasive messages nonverbal creatures, and is damaged by brain lesions (Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989), perceiving that interfere with language abilities. Imaging studies persons (Brewer & Harasty, 1996), and generating suggest that this system is mediated by regions close behavior from attitudes (Fazio, 1986). With this to the language centers in the brain. This array of widespread empirical support and the emergence of converging evidence from cognitive, neurolargely compatible dual-process theories in diverse psychological, and brain-imaging studies strongly domains (see Smith & DeCoster, 2000), this general suggests that two separate although interacting syspicture seems to be well accepted within social tems, analogous to the automatic /associative and psychology (although not universally so; Kruglanski, verbal / symbolic systems of the social psychological Thompson & Spiegel, 1999). Beyond social psydual-process models (Smith & DeCoster, 2000) also chology, other evidence comes from cognitive psyunderlie human numerical competence. Full underchology. Sloman (1996) argues that a key indicator standing of arithmetics depends on the interaction of the dual processing systems is the experience of and cooperation of both systems: the ability to seeing two incompatible answers to a problem, each calculate exact answers to problems and the biowith its own subjectively compelling ‘pull’. An logically more basic ability to grasp intuitively, for G.R. Semin, E.R. Smith / Cognitive Systems Research 3 (2002) 385–396 393 example, that 90 is larger than 40. We are reluctant to (c) Even thought or communication about abstract attribute true knowledge of arithmetic to a pocket ideas such as justice, knowledge, or love genercalculator, though it can do exact calculations much ally relies on bodily metaphors, as documented better than we can, precisely because it lacks a by Lakoff and Johnston (1999). linkage between the explicit symbols and the more (d) Verbal, symbolic thought allows us to think intuitive number sense. about abstract properties of objects (such as These dual-process models have clear implications ownership or value) that are seemingly far for situated cognition. The more implicit, automatic removed from the perceptual-motor properties behavior-generation system, the one that is continuthat drive situated thought. Yet even these abous with that of our evolutionary ancestors, is well stract properties are significant to us precisely characterized by the postulates of situated cognition because of their action relevance: for example, as they have been explored to date. For example, this ownership and value sharply constrain what we system relies on mental representations and becan do with an object. havioral tendencies activated and elicited by en(e) Finally and perhaps most important, even vervironmental cues (Gollwitzer, 1999). These reprebal / symbolic thought is motivationally driven sentations and behaviors are shaped through learning and goal-oriented (Higgins, 1997; Kruglanski, in the same or similar concrete situations in the past. 1996). Social psychological research on dualIn contrast, the verbal / symbolic system, at least process models clearly establishes that this mode on the surface, seems to operate much more like the of thought is effortful and therefore optional— traditional non-situated, representation-centric or innot engaged in constantly, but only when situaformation-processing view of cognition. Humans tionally elicited goals demand it. Thus the very evidently do at least sometimes construct abstract, occurrence of symbolic reasoning, as well as (to explicit inner descriptions, and use them to think some measure) the directions it takes, are subserabout objects or situations that are long ago, far vient to motivational constraints and hence to the away, counterfactual, or otherwise far removed from demands of situations and embodiment. the immediate world of situated action. Does it therefore make sense to say that verbal / symbolic Thus, although it cannot be claimed simply that thought, when it occurs, is not subject to the ‘all cognition is situated’, the constraints of situated constraints of situativity or embodiment and in fact action and embodiment actually reach deeply even reflects the traditional picture of cognition as deinto the realm of abstract, symbolic cognition—the tached, abstract information processing? one of our two processing modes that might be Our answer is no. While humans’ abilities to thought to most closely resemble the traditional conceptualize and reason symbolically give us impicture of cognition as abstract, disembodied inportant powers, they do not allow complete escape formation processing. from the constraints of the social situation and the body. Here are several ways in which situated and embodied cognition affect even abstract, symbolical6 . Conclusion ly mediated thought, as investigated by social psychology: Our hope is that this brief article has demonstrated that many key research areas relevant to situated and (a) Our verbal thought and overt communications embodied cognition are associated with rich existing are often shaped and tuned by our audiences, bodies of research and theory in social psychology. social relationships, or communicative partners In general, the social psychological research supports (Semin, 2000). the themes and claims of situated cognition, although (b) Symbolic thought makes use of concepts that are almost none of the research reviewed here was shaped not only by intrinsic or epistemic needs, originally generated from that particular viewpoint. but also by the constraints of interpersonal The situated cognition viewpoint helps organize that communication (Yamauchi & Markman, 2000). research into a coherent whole, however, by showing 394 G.R. Semin, E.R. 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