Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium
نویسنده
چکیده
A class of bargaining games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading constraints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian allocations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The result holds for any number of agents and is robust to different specifications of the bargaining process. © 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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