p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, we use p-best response sets—a set-valued extension of p-dominance—in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information: if there exists a set S which is a p-best response set with ∑I i=1 pi < 1, and there exists a unique correlated equilibrium μ∗ whose support is in S then μ∗ is a robust Nash equilibrium. © 2005 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: C72; D82
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 56 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006