Another characterization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom
نویسنده
چکیده
We provide another characterization of the Banzhaf value for TU games without the additivity axiom, which also works within the class of simple games and within the class of superadditive games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.
منابع مشابه
The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity
We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the e¢ciency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In this characterization, e¢ciency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011, Game Econ Behav 73: 615621), i.e., whenever the total worth generated does not change, a player can only gain at the expense of another one. Additivity and the equal treatment axiom are ...
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