The inverse plurality rule - an axiomatization
نویسندگان
چکیده
This note characterizes the ‘inverse plurality rule’, where voters specify only their least preferred alternative. This rule is characterized by a new minimal veto condition (MV) and the four well known conditions that characterize scoring rules; namely, Anonymity (A), Neutrality (N), Reinforcement (RE) and Continuity (C). Our new characterization result is related to the characterizations of approval voting and of the widely used plurality rule. JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D72.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 25 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005