A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters, and core equivalence under certain conditions.
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