Title Dynamic game of offending and law enforcement: a stochastic extension
نویسنده
چکیده
This note provides an extension of the Fend-Feichtinger-Tragler dynamic game of offending and law enforcement to a stochastic framework. This allows the analysis to reflect actual crime statistics which displays randomness in its distribution. Stochastic paths of crimes are derived. The asymptotic stationary distribution of crime records is also obtained.
منابع مشابه
Dynamic Game of Offending and Law Enforcement: a Stochastic Extension
This note provides an extension of the Fend-Feichtinger-Tragler dynamic game of offending and law enforcement to a stochastic framework. This allows the analysis to reflect actual crime statistics which displays randomness in its distribution. Stochastic paths of crimes are derived. The asymptotic stationary distribution of crime records is also obtained.
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