On the Manipulability of Votes: The Case of Approval Voting
نویسنده
چکیده
The famous result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite shows that every voting procedure is manipulable if the voters can have any preferences over the candidates. That is, a voter may improve the voting result by not voting according to his true preference. Approval voting, introduced by Brams and Fishburn, is not manipulable if preferences are dichotomous: each voter only distinguishes between acceptable and non-acceptable candidates. Approval voting offers a compromise between flexibility and non-manipulability of the voting procedure. Based on recent and ongoing research we discuss the extent to which approval voting is manipulable if preferences are more refined. We also provide some evidence that k-approval voting, in which voters approve of exactly k candidates, may offer an alternative to approval voting that is better in terms of potential manipulation. On the Manipulability of Votes: The Case of Approval Voting
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