Specialization and Efficiency with Labor-Market Matching∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper constructs a labor-market matching model with heterogeneous workers. Due to matching frictions, there may be a mismatch of talents within a production team, forcing a worker to specialize in a task at which she is not talented. We consider a partnership model where production takes place in teams consisting of two workers. We characterize the steadystate of the matching equilibrium. The constrained efficiency of the matching equilibrium depends on the distribution of talents. The constrained-efficient allocation can always be implemented by a type-specific tax. We also examine an alternative model with Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type matching between firms and workers.
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