Idiosyncratic Shocks in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
For the Cournot model, several authors studied the impact of a marginal cost variation on consumers’ surplus, firms’ profits and social welfare. We unify and extend the results when all the marginal costs change simultaneously, the direction and the magnitude of the variation being firm-specific.
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