Cheating monkeys undermine group strength in enemy territory.

نویسندگان

  • Margaret Chatham Crofoot
  • Ian C Gilby
چکیده

In many social animals, group-mates cooperate to defend their range against intrusion by neighboring groups. Because group size tends to be highly variable, such conflicts are often asymmetric. Although numerical superiority is assumed to provide a competitive advantage, small groups can generally defend their ranges, even when greatly outnumbered. The prevailing explanation for this puzzling phenomenon is that individuals in relatively large groups experience a greater temptation to flee from conflicts, in effect leveling the balance of power. Using playback experiments simulating territorial intrusions by wild capuchin monkey (Cebus capucinus) groups, we show that such a collective action problem does indeed undermine the competitive ability of large groups. Focal capuchins were more likely to run away from territorial intrusions when their group had a numeric advantage; each one-individual increase in relative group size raised the odds of flight by 25%. However, interaction location had a more important impact on individuals' reactions, creating a strong home-field advantage. After controlling for relative group size, the odds that a focal animal fled were 91% lower in experiments that occurred in the center compared with on the edge of its group's range, whereas the odds that it rushed toward the speaker were more than sixfold higher. These location-dependent patterns of defection and cooperation create a competitive advantage for residents over intruders across a wide range of relative group sizes, which may stabilize range boundaries and provide a general explanation for how groups of widely divergent sizes can coexist, even in the face of intense intergroup competition.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

WHEN TERRITORIAL SALAMANDERS CHEAT: A TEST OF THE DEAR ENEMY PHENOMENON IN SOUTHERN RED-BACKED SALAMANDERS. Kenzie

ENEMY PHENOMENON IN SOUTHERN RED-BACKED SALAMANDERS. Kenzie Medley, Biology. Faculty Advisor: Dr. Alicia Mathis The “dear enemy” hypothesis states that a territory owner shows reduced aggression toward a neighbor once territorial boundaries are established. Neighbors that do not restrict their activity to the agreed upon territory boundaries can be characterized as “cheaters” and might be subje...

متن کامل

Enemy Territory Traffic Analysis

We analyse the network traffic of the online multiplayer first person shooter game Enemy Territory. The game is based on the Quake 3 game engine but has more complex gaming rules. The data analysed is taken from a public game server run at CAIA, and corresponds to real gaming traffic. Measuring the packet length, inter-arrival time and bandwidth in both directions, this paper describes the impa...

متن کامل

Targeting Civilians in Ethno-Territorial Wars: Power- and Preference-Based Sources of Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Killing Strategies

In internal ethno-territorial conflicts, what explains why state or rebel group leaderships use civilian-targeting strategies—expulsion or mass killing strategies designed to punish enemy civilians or to decimate the enemy civilian presence on contested territory? One argument is that those living under the worst initial conditions—defined in terms of collective goods such as weak collective au...

متن کامل

Distribution of IP Source Addresses Experienced By Wolfenstein Enemy Territory Game Servers

Online multiplayer first person shooter (FPS) games typically limit themselves to between 4 and 30+ concurrent players, seemingly limiting the number of source IP addresses seen over time. However, this report demonstrates how common FPS game servers usually ‘experience’ traffic from hundreds of unique IP source addresses every minute, regardless of an individual game server’s popularity or loc...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

دوره 109 2  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012