Elliot Anshelevich
نویسنده
چکیده
My research interests center in the design and analysis of algorithms, especially in large decentralized networks. My main focus has largely been on algorithmic game theory, and more specifically on networks involving strategic agents. In order to understand such networks, I also study diffusion processes in social networks, and more generally approximation algorithms. An increasing number of networks at the forefront of scientific research, and of great importance to our world, consist of interactions of a large number of independent agents that we cannot control. Contrary to this, traditional study of network design assumes that there is a single network designer, and that its design is accepted and implemented by all parts of the network. Similarly, study involving network management assumes that some protocol is implemented in the network, and all parts of the network follow this protocol (or almost all parts, while a small part of the network is malicious). The lack of control of the agents can occur because of the self-interest of these independent agents (such as in peer-to-peer file sharing schemes, business contracts between companies, transportation networks consisting of individual cars, or social networks representing relationships between groups of people), or because the process involved inherently lacks control by outside forces (such as in epidemics spreading through a population). The outcomes and dynamics of such behavior often have very different properties from those of the centrally designed or managed networks. Therefore, dealing with such systems requires quite different methods and considerations, leading to new and exciting algorithmic questions. This fact and the enormous growth in the complexity of networked systems have made game theoretic techniques and networks of self-interested agents become a common theme in computer science. The major goal of my research is to design algorithms and develop mechanisms for dealing with and understanding such networks. While these networks cannot be fully controlled, they can often be influenced in a limited way, sometimes resulting in dramatic improvement of the global network behavior. I have focused on algorithms determining how such influence can be applied, as well as studying agent dynamics, and understanding the properties of equilibrium outcomes formed by such agents. The emphasis of my work is usually on algorithms and network properties with provable guarantees. My current major research topics are described below.
منابع مشابه
Vote Until Two of You Agree: Mechanisms with Small Distortion and Sample Complexity
To design social choice mechanisms with desirable utility properties, normative properties, and low sample complexity, we propose a new randomized mechanism called 2-Agree. This mechanism asks random voters for their top alternatives until at least two voters agree, at which point it selects that alternative as the winner. We prove that, despite its simplicity and low sample complexity, 2-Agree...
متن کاملThe Linearization of the Central Limit Operator in Free Probability Theory
We interpret the Central Limit Theorem as a fixed point theorem for a certain operator, and consider the problem of linearizing this operator. In classical as well as in free probability theory [VDN92], we consider two methods giving such a linearization, and interpret the result as a weak form of the CLT. In the classical case the analysis involves dilation operators; in the free case more gen...
متن کاملPricing and Forwarding Games for Inter-domain Routing
We address the question of strategic pricing of interdomain traffic forwarding services provided by ISPs, which is also closely coupled with the question of how ISPs route their traffic towards their neighboring ISPs. Posing this question as a non-cooperative game between neighboring ISPs, we study the properties of this pricing game in terms of the existence, computability, and efficiency of t...
متن کاملCoalitionally stable pricing schemes for inter-domain forwarding
In this work, we model and analyze the problem of stable and efficient pricing for interdomain traffic routing in the future Internet. We consider a general network topology with multiple sources and sinks of traffic, organized into separate domains managed by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) solely interested in maximizing their own profit. In this framework, we prove that there exists a pric...
متن کاملTerminal Backup , 3 D Matching , and Covering
We define a problem called Simplex Matching and show that it is solvable in polynomial time. While Simplex Matching is interesting in its own right as a nontrivial extension of nonbipartite min-cost matching, its main value lies in many (seemingly very different) problems that can be solved using our algorithm. For example, suppose that we are given a graph with terminal nodes, nonterminal node...
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