Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Revealed Preference Tests Using Supermarket Data: the Money Pump

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Testable Implications of Exponential Discounting

We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of exponentially discounted utility (EDU) over consumption streams. Given is an individual agent’s behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of purchases across periods. We show that such behavior satisfies a “revealed preference axiom” if and only if there exists a EDU model (a discount rate per period and a concave utility function o...

Nber Working Paper Series Experimenting with Measurement Error: Techniques with Applications to the Caltech Cohort Study

Measurement error is ubiquitous in experimental work. It leads to imperfect statistical controls, attenuated estimated effects of elicited behaviors, and biased correlations between characteristics. We develop simple statistical techniques for dealing with experimental measurement error. These techniques are applied to data from the Caltech Cohort Study, which conducts repeated incentivized sur...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Aggregation and Dynamics of Survey Responses: the Case of Presidential Approval

In this paper we critique much of the empirical literature on the important political science concept of presidential approval. Much of the recent research on presidential approval has focused on the dynamic nature of approval; arguments have raged about whether presidential approval is integrated, co-integrated, or fractionally integrated. We argue that none of these time-series concepts, impo...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 on Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Savage in the Market

We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent’s behavior in the market: assume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a “revealed preference axiom” if and only if there exists a SEU model (a subjective probability over states and a concave u...