Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full surplus extraction is generically possible. We interpret the McAfee-Reny condition as a much stronger ve...
متن کاملThe Genericity of the McAfee-Reny Condition for Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in models with a continuum of types. In this paper we show that it is satisfied by a generic set of model specifications. We extend the classical embedding theorem for continuous functions to account for a stronger geometric condition on the functions mapping abstract types into beliefs which is b...
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In this paper I study the possibility of full surplus extraction on arbitrary type spaces, with three main results: (i) I characterize full surplus extraction, (ii) I characterize full surplus extraction assuming that the surplus-extracting allocation is implementable, and (iii) I show that virtually full surplus extraction implies full surplus extraction. The characterizing condition in (ii) a...
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A number of studies, most notably Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in generic type spaces that admit a common prior and are of a fixed finite size, an uninformed seller can design mechanisms that extract all the surplus from privatelyinformed bidders. We show that this result hinges on the non-convexity of such a family of priors. When the ambient family of priors is convex, gene...
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I consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism first and then agents choose unobservable actions before they draw their types. The agents’ actions affect not only their payoffs directly but also a distribution of private types as well. Thus, the distribution of types is determined endogenously rather than exogeneously unlike standard mechanism design literature. Then I exten...
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