Neo-speciesism.

Speciesists believe that membership in a particular species is morally relevant. Morally relevant properties entitle their possessors to have their interests considered preferentially relative to those individuals who lack that property. Those dispensing consideration incur obligations or, minimally, options, to act with bias. As a matter of fact, all known speciesists are human speciesists, not in the sense that only humans—and not tigers and cows— believe that species is a morally relevant attribute, but in the respect that they believe that human interests ought to be favored over the like interests of members of other species. We can distinguish between absolute and indexical speciesists. Absolutists believe that human interests ought to be preferentially considered by any individual capable of giving special treatment. So if lions or Martians have this capability then, if a relevant situation presents itself, the lion and tiger ought to prioritize the interests of humans over the interests of the members of their own or any other species. If an absolute human speciesist were asked who ought to favor the interests of humans, her answer would be “every individual who can.” Indexicalists believe that the obligations of preferred treatment attach only to the members of that species; the property “being a member of species S” determines not only who ought to be favored but also who ought to do the favoring. So if lions can dispense special treatment then, in a relevant circumstance the lion ought to favor a lion over the like interests of both humans and Martians. Similarly, Martians owe “their own” preferential concern. If an indexical human speciesist were asked who ought to favor the interests of humans, her answer would be “only other able humans.” Armed with this distinction and adamantly claiming allegiance to indexicality, some speciesists now think that their partialism is blessed by morality. Since members of any species are permitted to extend special concern to their fellow species’ members, indexical speciesists view their partialism as fairly administered. But, there is less here than meets the eye. We can grant the indexical partialist “fair” appropriation of his partialism where this is tantamount to universal dispensation. But universalization of partial behavior does not make impartial morality. Consider the ethical egoist who universalizes his racism by suggesting that everyone (including himself) should mistreat anyone (including himself) who is African-American. Or reflect upon the indexical negative speciesist who believes that members of a species ought to treat the interests of their co-members with less consideration than the like interests of members of other species. A reasonable inquiry would be to ask this admittedly eccentric person why he holds this view calling for