Towards an Integrated Theory of Self-Consciousness

Self-consciousness is an issue that is of fundamental theoretical significance in philosophy. It is at the root of many other philosophical issues ranging from epistemological questions (i.e., the problem of self-knowledge) to those that are metaphysical (i.e., the concept of a person or a "self") or moral (i.e., issues of moral agency or autonomy). In the philosophy of mind the problem of self-consciousness is closely related to various other philosophical issues, such as cognition, phenomenal consciousness, personal identity and so on. So far, many attempts have been made to provide a theory of self-consciousness. Following the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy, such a theory is often thought to be found through an analysis of the linguistic expressions of self-consciousness, in particular the semantics of the first person pronoun (Spitzley 2000). However, this approach has been called into question, both by proponents of phenomenological accounts and, more recently, by those advocating theories of nonconceptual content. Proponents of these alternative approaches argue that in order to give an account of self-consciousness we ought to look at nonreflective or nonconceptual ways of representing the self that provide the foundation for our later ability to acquire a concept of ourselves (e.g., Zahavi 2005; Frank 1991; Bermúdez 1998; Hurley 1997; Legrand 2006, 2007; Vosgerau 2009). Accordingly, following this view, self-consciousness can be conceived of as a complex phenomenon that manifests itself in multiple ways. Needless to say, this broader way of addressing the issue raises a number of new questions. For example, how are we to understand the thesis that there are nonconceptual or nonreflective forms of self-consciousness? What is its structure and how does it relate to higher-level forms of self-consciousness? More generally, the debate on self-consciousness has expanded in scope in recent years and, at the same time, has become more specialised. In addition to the investigation of so-called nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness and their relation to higher-level, conceptual forms of self-representation, other research has emphasized the intersubjective or temporal aspects of self-awareness. Unfortunately, despite intensive research in many of these areas discussions of these different facets of self-consciousness have remained relatively isolated. This may be due in part to the different methodological angles from which they tend to be approached.