On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences¤
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to properties of the material payo¤ function is analyzed. Finally, it is shown that with incomplete information only sel...sh preferences are evolutionarily stable.
منابع مشابه
On the Evolutionary Stability of Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences
This note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability, presented by Bester and Güth (1998), applies under more general preference and payoff functions. JEL Classification: C72; A13
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