ITRI-97-09 Domains of Discourse and the Semantics of Ambiguous Utterances: A Reply to Gauker

In this paper, an argument from Gauker against the so-called expressive theory of communication is reviewed and rejected. In particular, a case of miscommunication which Gauker thought to be problematic for the expressive theory is analysed in terms of what Gauker called the ‘neutral perspective’ on miscommunication, a perspective which is shown to accord well with recent semantic theories of underspecified meaning as well as with the expressive theory. 1 Gauker on Domains of Discourse In a number of recent publications, including a paper in Mind titled ”Domains of Discourse” (Gauker 1997), Christopher Gauker has chosen a powerful opponent which he calls the expressive theory of communication and which he characterizes as ”(...) any conception of language according to which the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey propositions to hearers” (Gauker 1997, p.5). There and elsewhere (Gauker 1992, Gauker 1994(b)), Gauker has argued that the expressive theory lies at the heart of most theorizing about language and communication, including such diverse authors as (John) Locke, Fodor, Davidson, Jackendoff, Grice, Searle, and Sperber and Wilson (see Gauker 1992, 1997 for references). Gauker’s strategy against the expressive theory is to present several thought experiments that involve linguistic communication and then to argue that some of these cannot be understood along the lines of the expressive theory. The central thought experiment is a case of miscommunication that will be quoted verbatim: Suzy is sitting on the floor in her bedroom playing with glass marbles. All of themarbles in Suzy’s room belong to Suzy, and some of them are red. Suddenly Tommy comes into Suzy’s room and declares in a loud voice, ”All of the red ones are mine!”. As a matter of fact, when Tommy says, ”All of the red ones are mine!” he is thinking of the marbles in his own room, and it is the thought that all of the red marbles in his room are his that leads him to speak as he does. Tommy is very proud of his possessions and on this occasion is exulting in his possession of red marbles. But there is no way Suzy could know that. She would naturally expect that he was talking about the marbles there on the floor in plain view of both of them. So of course she retorts, ”No, they’re not!” (Gauker 1997, p.1-2). The source of the conflict can be located in the domain of discourse used for the noun phrase ‘All of the red ones’ in Tommy’s utterance: for Tommy, this domain consists of the marbles in his room; for Suzy, it consists of the marbles in her room. The way Gauker contrasts this example with other examples–most notably one that involves a slip of the tongue1–makes it clear that Tommy’s utterance is thought to be genuinely ambiguous between Tommy’s and Suzy’s interpretation. In other words, it is assumed that the semantic and pragmatic rules of English do not rule out one of the two interpretations, even if all aspects of the ‘external context’ are taken into account.2 (‘External context’ is Gauker’s term for all publicly 1This is the example on p.13 where Julie says ‘The book in my hand belongs to me’, while she had meant to say ‘The book in my hand belongs to you’. Examples of this kind are deemed by Gauker not to pose important problems to the expressive theory, since the utterances in them determine one unique proposition as their interpretation, and consequently, attributing a truth value to them is unproblematic. 2It may be thought that this is incorrect and that Tommy’s interpretation is in fact pragmatically infelicitous. In that case, a more plausible version of the example may be constructed by putting Tommy and Suzy at