A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting

On E¤ective Minimax Payo¤s and Unequal Discounting

We show that the Folk theorem in Wen (1994) may not fully characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium payo¤ set in a repeated game with unequal discounting, where a player’s equilibrium payo¤ could be strictly less than her e¤ective minimax payo¤ . Keywords: repeated games, e¤ective minimax values, heterogenous discounting JEL Classi…cation: C73

Characterizing the Limit Set of PPE Payoffs with Unequal Discounting

We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are suffi cient for the folk theorem. ∗[email protected] †The author is thankful to Stephe...

The Folk Theorem for all Games with Almost Perfect Monitoring

We study repeated games with private monitoring. We prove the folk theorem with discounting for all games assuming that the monitoring is almost perfect and the payoffs satisfy the full-dimensionality condition. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players, no public randomization, and we allow for minmax payoffs in mixed strategies.

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Incomplete; Information

Probabilistic Cheap Talky

We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged. We also show that if there is no discounting, this uncertainty imparts a sequent...