On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 17 July 2008 Available online 27 January 2009 JEL classification: C71
منابع مشابه
Algorithms for Core Stability, Core Largeness, Exactness, and Extendability of Flow Games
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 67 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009