Documentos de trabajo Extensive form games and strategic complementarities
نویسنده
چکیده
I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of xed points of a correspondence. The correspondence has a natural interpretation. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out| surprisingly|to be a very restrictive class of games. Res umen Se demuestra el equivalente para equilibrios perfectos por subjuegos del resultado b asico sobre los equilibrios de un juego con complementariedades estrat egicas: el conjunto de equilibrios es un reticulado no-vac o y completo. Con este prop osito se introduce una herramienta que permite estudiar los equilibrios perfectos por subjuegos como los puntos jos de una correspondencia. Los resultados tienen una limitaci on importante porque|sorpresivamente|la complementariedad en la forma extensiva es una propiedad muy restrictiva. JEL Classi cation: C72, C73. Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley and Departamento de Econom a, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. email: [email protected]. I am very grateful to Ilya Segal and Chris Shannon for many helpful discussions. I also wish to thank Bob Anderson, and Matthew Rabin for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Documentos de trabajo Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by rst-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extr...
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I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. The correspondence has a natural interpretation. M...
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