The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Individual Learning
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study repeated games where players observe noisy private signals about the unknown state of the world in every period. We find a sufficient condition under which the folk theorem obtains by ex-post equilibria. Our condition is satisfied for generic signal distributions as long as each player has at least two possible private signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
منابع مشابه
Folk theorem with communication
This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [6] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some two-pl...
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